

SECRET

7 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI


SUBJECT: AM/EE

REMARKS: US Policy toward Cuba

1. As Mr. McGeorge Bundy said at the last Tuesday luncheon: "Anything that we can do won't work, and anything that will work is war."

2. Possible US courses of action toward Cuba range from the present one of making clear what we will accept -- while taking steps to assure ourselves that our bases are being not -- up to invasion of the island. There is much to be said for the flexibility of a policy which would involve following the present course -- using every opportunity which circumstances and our own tactics provide for reducing the Soviet presence and increasing Castro's difficulties -- but shifting rapidly to the course of physical intervention if and when prevention by Castro provides the occasion and the opportunity for successful use of such means.

3. Mounting evidence of impending problems for Castro in the domestic economic and political fields and in his relations with the Soviets point to a more favorable environment for



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activities within the first phase of the flexible policy described above. Chances that internal problems and conflicts with the Soviets will produce a change in Castro or the Cuban regime which will make an acceptable *modus vivendi* with the US possible are slight, but such problems could greatly reduce the threat of the Communist presence in Cuba to the US and Latin America.

4. If intelligence shows that there is reasonable doubt about the Soviet removal from Cuba of the military threat to the US, and if there is reason to believe that the Soviets are preparing to confront the US with the announcement of the turnover of sophisticated weapons in Cuba to the Cubans, it would be well for the US to move first to demand that satisfactory demonstration be given of the withdrawal of strategic weapons by provision for on-site inspection. Such demands might be made under threat of a petroleum blockade.

5. The use of military force by the US in the Cuban situation would be politically easier and more likely of success if it were undertaken in response to a major provocation to the integrity of a Latin American state. If it were calculated that circumstances were favorable for intervention, it might be better if such action were not taken to forestall the violation of another country by Cuba but were postponed until the fact of that intervention became abundantly clear.

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6. Military intervention in Cuba, except in circumstances of a breakdown of the Communist regime's ability to control the country, or in case of flagrant aggression by Cuban forces in another country, is likely to be politically costly to the US in many important parts of Latin America and to impose a heavy burden of responsibility for the government and economic subsistence of Cuba.

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